Power Under One Roof: Why Ghana Must Rethink Parliamentary Security

State security has always been a major priority for countries across the world. From stringent security protocols and movement restrictions to sophisticated surveillance systems and strategic defence mechanisms, governments continue to invest substantial resources in protecting critical national institutions against potential threats.

In the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries that maintain heightened security around sensitive government installations, protecting the institutions of state is a matter of national importance. Ghana, too, has established a visible security presence across the country, particularly through police checkpoints and other security measures along major roads and at strategic locations.

During a visit to one of Africa’s more developed countries, I travelled approximately 36 kilometres from the airport to my destination at about 1 a.m. without encountering a single police checkpoint. The experience contrasted sharply with the numerous checkpoints one may encounter on similar journeys in Ghana.

However, the visibility of security personnel and the frequency of checkpoints do not necessarily translate into comprehensive security or guarantee public confidence. The more important question is whether our security arrangements adequately identify, anticipate and mitigate the risks confronting critical state institutions.

This brings me to a subject that deserves serious national attention: How appropriate is it for Ghana to concentrate so many senior state officials, including key figures in the national security architecture, under one roof during important state functions such as the State of the Nation Address?

Article 67 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana requires the President to deliver a message on the state of the nation to Parliament at the beginning of each session of Parliament and before its dissolution. The constitutional provision establishes the President’s obligation to address Parliament, but it does not prescribe the attendance of every senior state official who routinely gathers in the parliamentary chamber for the occasion.

Over the years, the State of the Nation Address has evolved into a major national ceremony, bringing together political leaders, judicial officers, senior public officials, diplomats and representatives of the security services.

Beyond the President, Vice-President and Speaker of Parliament, the gathering may include the Chief Justice, other justices of the Supreme Court, deputy speakers, presidential staffers, the Inspector-General of Police, military commanders and the heads of the Ghana National Fire Service, Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Prisons Service and other security institutions, alongside their deputies and senior officers.

Their presence demonstrates the unity of the state and the importance attached to the occasion. Yet it also raises a legitimate security question: What happens if an unforeseen incident targets the chamber while so many of the country's senior decision-makers and security leaders are gathered in one location?

The concern is not that these officials should be excluded from important national ceremonies. Rather, it is whether the state has adequately assessed the risks associated with concentrating so many individuals, some of whom perform critical constitutional, judicial, executive and security functions, within a single facility.

Such an incident could extend beyond casualties or damage to infrastructure. Depending on its nature and severity, it could disrupt the continuity of government, complicate emergency coordination and temporarily weaken the state's capacity to respond effectively to a national crisis.

The issue, therefore, is not simply attendance. It is the resilience of the state when a critical institution or gathering comes under threat.

Another dimension of parliamentary security that deserves attention is the airspace surrounding the precincts of Parliament.

Aircraft taking off from or approaching Accra International Airport can sometimes be seen or heard from the parliamentary area. Given the proximity of Parliament to established aviation routes, it is reasonable to ask whether the relevant authorities have conducted and regularly reviewed the necessary risk assessments.

This observation does not, in itself, establish that Parliament's airspace is inadequately protected. Nor does the presence of aircraft overhead necessarily indicate a security breach. However, it raises questions about coordination between national security agencies, aviation authorities and the officials responsible for parliamentary security.

Are the risks associated with the location adequately assessed? Are the relevant agencies coordinating effectively? Are the appropriate protective arrangements in place for exceptional circumstances?

These are questions that deserve professional assessment by the competent authorities rather than speculation or public disclosure of sensitive security arrangements.

In an era of evolving security threats, the protection of critical national institutions must extend beyond their immediate physical boundaries. It must include a comprehensive assessment of the surrounding environment, potential threats and the ability to respond to emergencies.

History offers sobering reminders of the vulnerability of institutions of state.

In 1999, armed gunmen stormed Armenia's parliament and killed the prime minister, the parliamentary speaker and other senior officials. The attack demonstrated how an assault on a legislative institution can simultaneously target the country's political leadership and disrupt the functioning of government.

In Turkey in July 2016, during an attempted coup, the parliament building and the presidential complex were attacked from the air. The events demonstrated that threats to national institutions can take different forms and may emerge during periods of political instability.

The United States also offers an important example. On September 11, 2001, hijackers associated with al-Qaeda crashed American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 passenger aircraft, into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, near Washington, D.C. The attack exposed the devastating consequences of an aircraft being used as a weapon against a major national security installation.

Following the September 11 attacks, the United States strengthened aviation security and maintained stringent flight restrictions around sensitive sites in the Washington, D.C., region, including the Pentagon and the White House.

The lesson is not that Ghana faces an identical threat or that its parliamentary precincts are necessarily exposed to the same vulnerabilities. Rather, these experiences reinforce the importance of risk assessment, inter-agency coordination, protective planning and the continuous review of security arrangements around critical institutions.

Ghana must learn from international experience without waiting for a similar tragedy to expose weaknesses in its own security architecture.

The Clerk to Parliament of Ghana, Rev. Ebenezer Ahumah Djietror, has renewed calls for the construction of a new parliamentary chamber and the provision of improved working facilities to address the infrastructural challenges confronting the Legislature.

His concerns are understandable. Parliament requires adequate meeting rooms, office accommodation, caucus facilities and dedicated spaces for ministers and Members of Parliament. The shortage of suitable working spaces can affect consultations, committee activities, legislative coordination and the overall efficiency of parliamentary business.

The case for a modern parliamentary complex must therefore be taken seriously. A new chamber should not be viewed merely as a project to provide additional seating for Members of Parliament. It should form part of a broader effort to build a functional, accessible, technologically advanced and resilient legislative institution.

However, the argument for a new parliamentary complex would be incomplete if it focused exclusively on infrastructure and administrative convenience without adequately incorporating security considerations.

A modern parliamentary complex must be designed not only to accommodate power, but also to protect the continuity of the state.

The planning process should therefore incorporate comprehensive security assessments, emergency response arrangements, resilient communications infrastructure, appropriate access controls and coordination among the relevant security and aviation authorities. It should also consider how essential parliamentary and state functions would continue during an emergency.

Equally important is the question of institutional concentration. Where major state functions bring numerous senior officials together, contingency planning should account for the possibility that a single incident could affect several institutions simultaneously. This requires careful planning by the appropriate authorities, including measures that preserve continuity of government without unnecessarily compromising the openness and constitutional character of Parliament.

The Clerk's call for improved facilities is commendable. However, a modern legislative complex presents an opportunity to address a broader range of institutional needs, including the protection of those who work in Parliament, those who visit it and the constitutional functions it serves.

Ghana should consider establishing a Designated Survivor System as part of a broader national policy on continuity of government and emergency preparedness. A designated survivor is a government official selected in advance to remain at a secure, separate location when the President, Vice-President, Speaker of Parliament, ministers and other senior state officials gather for major national events.

The purpose is to ensure that, in the unlikely event of a catastrophic incident that kills or incapacitates several senior leaders simultaneously, the country can maintain essential government operations and coordinate an orderly response. Events such as the State of the Nation Address, presidential inaugurations and major national ceremonies provide examples of occasions when such precautions could be considered.

Although Article 60 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana provides for presidential succession and the performance of presidential functions when the President or Vice-President is unable to act, a designated-survivor arrangement would address the wider operational challenge of maintaining government functions during a national emergency. It must not override the constitutional order of succession or automatically confer presidential powers on the designated official.

Ghana could therefore explore a formal continuity-of-government framework that identifies appropriate officials, establishes secure communication and emergency coordination procedures, protects essential government records and services, and clarifies the responsibilities of relevant institutions. Such a framework should be developed through appropriate constitutional, legal and national security assessments.

The objective is not to create unnecessary alarm but to strengthen national preparedness. The continuity of the Ghanaian state should not depend solely on the survival of its senior political leaders at any single gathering. A well-designed system could help safeguard constitutional governance, institutional stability and public confidence in the event of an unforeseen national catastrophe.

National security planning should not be driven by fear, nor should legitimate concerns be dismissed simply because a threat has not yet materialised. The responsible approach is to identify vulnerabilities, assess risks and take proportionate preventive measures before a crisis occurs.

Ghana's Parliament is more than a building. It is a constitutional institution at the heart of democratic governance. Its protection is inseparable from the protection of the officials who serve the state and the continuity of the democratic process itself.

The debate over a new parliamentary chamber must therefore move beyond questions of seating capacity, office space and administrative convenience. It should include a broader national conversation about institutional resilience, the concentration of senior officials, aviation-related risk assessments and emergency preparedness.

The objective is not to create unnecessary alarm or to suggest that an attack is imminent. It is to ensure that decisions about the future of Parliament reflect the realities of contemporary security planning.

A new parliamentary complex, if pursued, should represent an investment in the future of Ghana's democracy: a facility that supports effective legislative work while meeting appropriate standards of safety, resilience and continuity.

The question is no longer whether security deserves a place in the conversation. It is whether we are giving it the attention it deserves before the next major investment in our parliamentary infrastructure is made.

When the nation's political leadership and security architecture gather under one roof, should we wait for an incident to expose the risks, or should we act now to ensure that our institutions are prepared?

Ghana must choose preparedness over complacency. The time to ask these questions is before a crisis, not after one.

Samuel Awuni
Communications Professional